林志昇控美案的重要辯論文
法院： 帕特森女士。
帕特森：請求法院，梅利莎*帕特森將代表美國。庭上，我們要求法院以確定的方法，駁回原告的行動。理由是為了解決美國對台灣的法理主權，它將涉及政治問題，或者，如果本法院逐字在這裡分析訴訟，就斷言原告根據美國的移民法和國籍法成為國民。我認為，那就太輕視本案，認為可以就案情的法定理由，來顯示國民在法律範圍內的定義，是出生在美國外圍屬地者，其實僅限於美國薩摩亞和斯溫斯島。
法院：就有關舊金山和平條約地位，美國政府立場是什麼？特別是，美國是不是主要佔領權國的用語？這是不是一條好的法律？
帕特森：我認為這條約是有效的。我們是還沒有採取的行動，美國是否為事實上的主要的佔領者，對不起，美國還沒有˙˙˙我要明確指出，美國並非台灣的主要佔領權國。
法院：美國已經改變了嗎？因為這是該條約的用語，不對嗎？
帕特森：是的，條約有規定，但我認為有一些相關的變化，如果法院是著眼於法理主權。首先，在1954年共同防禦條約中，美國承認台灣是中華民國管轄中的領土。1972年，我們開始與中華人民共和國對談。1978年，卡特總統宣布，截至1979年1月1日我們中止與中華民國外交關係，與中華人民共和國建交。
法院：但它為何與主要佔領國的用語不合？也許1954年共同防禦條約是承認一個政府，叫中華民國。
帕特森：當然，庭上。
法院：是否有任何其他的例子？或者那已足夠了？
帕特森：我認為那是足夠了，庭上。再次，我們沒有提供給舊金山和平條約的解釋，因為我們不認為這是與此有關。原告控訴的是，舊金山和平條約使美國成為主要佔領國，然後，他們採取跳躍式的推理說，這意味著美國是法理主權者，然後再一個跳躍，以法理主權說他們是國民。
法院：那句話究竟意何所指？我意思是它必然代表某種含意。
帕特森：主要佔領國？
法院：對，沒錯。
帕特森：我認為，是指在當時美國簽署該條約，它是日本的主要佔領權國。我有些猶豫，來提供一個明確的，美國的最終確立該條約，因為再次，我們就是不認為這是與此有關。原告聲稱他們的權利，追循的不是單純地根據該條約，而是從一個事實，即該條約使美國成為台灣法理上的主權者。而美國已經非常，非常清楚地表明，無論誰是台灣法理上的主權者，它不會是美國。這是所有原告訴求的依據-
法院：如果，事實上，該條約，條約的用語，創造了美國是法理上的主權者，美國有退路來退出這一條約嗎？我不認為他們可以。
帕特森：當然，庭上，我認為任何爭論，誰是一個領土的法理主權者？是完全由政治部門來定奪。
法院：如果一項條約規定，美國是法理上的主權-
帕特森：我認為-
法院： -行政部門可以單方面改變嗎？
帕特森：我有點動搖。我在思考高華德訴卡特案，但我認為總統可以-
法院：讓我來幫你，答案是當然否定的。
帕特森：好吧，但我不相信該條約有什麼，可以確立美國是法理主權者，我認為，要構成這個境界，需要看該條約在這裡的內容，法院的聲明是如何來審視政治議題。而這個法院在Vanquil （拼音藻。 ）的明確判決和引用貝克說，你需要-
法院：這裡所不同的是，該條約的語言是否支持律師妳所說。如果，事實上，主要佔領權國的用語言是指美國是在法理上的主權國，妳就麻煩了。
帕特森：嗯-
法院：妳遇到麻煩了。
帕特森：讓我來提供美國的立場，這不是該條約的旨意。這可能意味著，這並不指美國是台灣法理上的主權者，我認為要解決這一問題，本法院應履行判別分析，在這裡特別提出的問題。而這特別在這裡提出的問題不是，美國是否應該是主要佔領權國，而是原告的美國國民訴求，進一步與否，指美國是台灣在法理上的主權者，而就這兩個問題，原告的訴求注定要失敗。
以下是原文：
THE COURT: Ms. Patterson.
MS. PATTERSON: May it please the Court, Melissa Patterson on behalf of the United States.Your Honors, we ask this Court to affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the action here either on the grounds that in order to resolve the United States de jure sovereignty over Taiwan would involve a political question or if this Court construes the complaint here to only assert that plaintiffs are nationals under the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I think that can be exposed just simply on the merits on the statutory grounds to be a national is defined within that act as persons born in the outlying possessions of the United States which are limited to America, Samoa and Swains Island.
THE COURT: What is the Government’s position about status of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, particularly the language that United States is the principal occupying power? Is that good law?
MS. PATTERSON: I believe the treaty is in effect. We have not taken a position on whether or not the United States is, in fact, the principal occupying, I’m sorry, the United States has not --let me be clear. The United States is not the principal occupying power over Taiwan.
THE COURT: What has changed, because that’s the language of the treaty, right?
MS. PATTERSON: Yes, but I think there have been several pertinent changes if this Court is looking at de jure sovereignty. First of all, there was the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty in which the United States recognized Taiwan to be among the Republic of China’s territories. In 1972 we began talks with the People’s Republic of China. In 1978, President Carter announced that as of January 1, 1979 we would be discontinuing diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and opening up relations with the People’s Republic of China.
THE COURT: But how is that inconsistent with the language of the principal occupying power? That perhaps the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty is recognizing a government, the Republic of China.
MS. PATTERSON: Certainly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are there any other examples, or is that sufficient?
MS. PATTERSON: I think that’s sufficient, Your Honor. Again we haven’t offered up an interpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty because we don’t think it’s relevant here. What plaintiffs are arguing is that the San Francisco Peace Treaty makes the United States the principal occupying power and then they take in inferential leap to say that means that the United States is the de jure sovereign and then there’s another leap to de jure sovereignty means that they are nationalists.
THE COURT: What does that language mean though? I mean it means something.
MS. PATTERSON: The principal occupying power?
THE COURT: Yes, right.
MS. PATTERSON: I believe that refers to the fact that at the time the United States signed that treaty, it was the principal occupying power of Japan. I’m a little hesitant to offer a definitive, the United States definitive construction of that treaty because again, we just don’t think it’s relevant here. Plaintiffs are claiming that they have rights that stem not simply under that treaty, but from the fact that that treaty makes the United States the de jure sovereign over Taiwan. And the United States has made it very, very clear that whoever the de jure sovereign of Taiwan is, it is not the United States. Moreover, all of plaintiffs’ claims are based -
THE COURT: If, in fact, the treaty, that language of treaty creates the United States as the de jure sovereign, can the United States walk away from that treaty? I don’t think they can.
MS. PATTERSON: Certainly, Your Honor, I think that any questions about who the de jure sovereign is over a territory are entirely within the province of the political branches.
THE COURT: If a treaty is established that the United States is the de jure sovereign -
MS. PATTERSON: I believe that -
THE COURT: --would the Executive unilaterally change that?
MS. PATTERSON: I’m a little shaky. In my reflection of Goldwater v. Carter, but I believe that the president can -
THE COURT: Let me help you, the answer is no.
MS. PATTERSON: Okay, but so I don’t believe there’s anything in that treaty that would establish the United States as the de jure sovereign, and I think that the extent to which you need to look at that treaty here is somewhat informed by this Court’s statements about how you go about examining a political question. And this Court in the Vanquil (phonetic sp.) decision clearly and quoting Baker said you need to -
THE COURT: What’s different here is if the language of the treaty supports what counsel said. If, in fact, the language principal occupying power means that the United States is the de jure sovereign, you’re in trouble.
MS. PATTERSON: Well -
THE COURT: You’re in trouble.
MS. PATTERSON: Let me offer up the United States’ position that that is not what that treaty means. Whatever else it may mean, it does not mean that the United States is the de jure sovereign over Taiwan and I think in resolving this question, this Court should look to perform that discriminating analysis of the particular question posed here. And the particular question posed here is not whether or not the United States is the principal occupying power, but whether or not plaintiffs are nationals of the United States and further whether or not the United States is the de jure sovereign over Taiwan, and on both of those questions, plaintiffs’ claims fail.
THE COURT: If the United States is the de jure sovereign over Taiwan, would they be nationals?
MS. PATTERSON: Not necessarily, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay, so it’s possible that those questions are actually separate.
MS. PATTERSON: Yes, Your Honor. And as we -
THE COURT: Why is that? I don’t -
MS. PATTERSON: Because national is a statutory term defined in Immigration Nationality Act.
THE COURT: America, Samoa and Swain Islands -
MS. PATTERSON: Exactly, Your Honor. And I suppose that plaintiffs are alleging that there is some non-statutory route to national status and I think that there’s a pretty solid wall of precedent all eight circuit courts to have examined whether or not you can become a national within the meaning of the Immigration Act by any non-statutory routes. They clearly said you cannot.
THE COURT: But what right -
THE COURT: Was that still true after Boumediene?
MS. PATTERSON: I -
THE COURT: I mean I think what Mr. Camp is arguing is that if de facto sovereignty is enough, then if they have a claim of de jure sovereignty, they’re actually in a stronger position.
MS. PATTERSON: I think that’s simply not true, Your Honor. All of the cases, Boumediene and the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court made it clear that what they were examining there was the United States objected to degree of controller perhaps de facto sovereignty. And the Boumediene decision explicitly noted the same language that the District Court here noted from Vamiliar Brown (phonetic sp.) they declined to question the Government’s assertion that the United States was not the de jure sovereign over Guantanamo Bay, just as this Court should decline to question the Executive’s assertion that United States is not the de jure sovereign over Taiwan. So in all of the plaintiffs’ claims here rest on an assertion of de jure sovereignty. They are not asserting nor could they assert that the United States exercises any actual control over Taiwan.
THE COURT: But doesn’t that lead us to a sort of odd result that de facto sovereignty is more powerful than de jure sovereignty if that’s what exists here?
MS. PATTERSON: That may be odd, but that’s what the Supreme Court said and actually I think there’s a good reason for that, Your Honor. In the Insular Cases, or at least in the Boumediene decision discussing the Insular Cases, the court said the issue there wasn’t necessarily about the you know, de jure reach of the Constitution over a particular territory. It was what limitations in here and the United States’ actual exercise of power over people so that the constitutional limitations follow an actual exercise of power as opposed to a paper trail.
THE COURT: What rights would come to someone who couldn’t meet the statutory requirement for being a national but lived in a territory over which the United States exercises de jure sovereignty?
MS. PATTERSON: I don’t know that that question’s ever been presented because I don’t think it’s ever been explored if the United States holds simply de jure sovereignty but doesn’t exercise any actual control. I don’t know what rights we have there.
THE COURT: --but what about in de facto sovereignty, I’m just wondering other than the statutory right regarding national which you say precludes, are there any other rights that someone would have?
MS. PATTERSON: If the United States were exercising, I think your question is de facto?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. PATTERSON: Yes, I think the Insular Cases did discuss what various rights would attend the United States exercise of actual power of their objective degree or control. And the court noted that it’s a highly case specific type of analysis that depends on the United States’ particular relationship. And I think in some of those Insular Cases, the court indicated that the stronger the ties, the more the control the United States had over the area. That could change the shape of the constitutional limitations that went with the exercise of that power. So I can’t offer you up a general laundry list of rights that might go along with an exercise of de facto power.
THE COURT: So they don’t include the right to a passport.
MS. PATTERSON: I don’t think they would include the right to the passport, certainly, Your Honor. If there are no further questions from the Court, the Government will rest.
THE COURT: Actually I do have a question.
MS. PATTERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: It’s a minor point. In your red brief at 18, you quote our decision in Boumediene that quote, “The determination of sovereignty over an area is for the legislative and Executive requirements.” Do you agree with that, is that a legislative function, determination of sovereignty over an area? I would have thought that the Government’s position would be that that’s exclusively for the Executive. And the Constitution gives to the Executive the right to recognize ambassadors (indiscernible).
MS. PATTERSON: Well certainly, Article 2 is rich with delegations to the Executive Branch. To the extent that the legislative powers hold a role here, I think that they’ve clearly spoken in this case. I don’t know if every case would involve a legislative weighing in on the particular sovereignty.
這是原文，不容任何人斷章取義，我們會注意中統派言論。
作者：林 志 昇（武林 志昇˙林 峯弘）
「福爾摩沙法理建國會」執行長
2009/10/15
