美機密檔案台灣實相
台灣民政府公布美機密檔案台灣實相 1
Taiwan in Truth
【台灣實相內容由美國國家機密檔案室提供。】
One of the first secret CIA reports on Taiwan was issued March 14, 1949, and was titled Probable Developments in Taiwan. The secret report stated:
At the present time Taiwan is not legally a part of the Chinese Republic. Its status remains to be determined in the peace treaty with Japan. The island has, however, been under Chinese administration since the Japanese surrender in 1945. China's position in Taiwan rests on (1) military control, and (2) the Cairo Declaration of November 1943, in which the US and the UK as well as China announced their purpose to restore Taiwan and the Pescadores to the Republic of China. The US and the UK reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration at Potsdam on 26 July 1945. Subsequently the USSR adhered to the Potsdam Proclamation, and thereby to the Cairo Declaration.
However, neither the U.S. nor any other power, has formally recognized the annexation by China of Taiwan, the legal status of which, until the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty, is that of an occupied territory in which the US, as well as the other participants in the war against Japan, still have proprietary interests.
There is strong sentiment in Taiwan favoring autonomy, but the situation is complicated by the conflicting interest of the native Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalist elements. The Taiwanese bitterly resent the performance of the Nationalist administration on Taiwan since VJ-day. The Chinese rulers have exploited the native population to the limit, without regard for their welfare or the preservation of the island’s resources. The explosive nature of the Taiwanese problem was dramatically demonstrated in the abortive insurrection of 1947.
A successful Taiwanese rebellion against the Chinese Government in the near future is quite improbable, owing to lack of effective organization and leadership and the presence of Nationalist military forces on the island.
由以上1949年3月14日所提出之CIA報告可得知：
1. 依戰爭法，被佔領地是被視為外國(Occupied territory is regarded as foreign)，中華民國是「佔領日本台灣」而「非光復中國台灣」。
2. 本土台灣人自治和國民政府因利益衝突而情況複雜。
3. 中國佔領當局非但未依國際法善盡佔領義務，保護被佔領方台灣人其生命和財產，反而極力剝削台灣人，確為「不法治理」，以致台灣人「反抗有理」。
4. 國際社會將228事件定位為「1947年台灣人反抗中國人統治(Taiwanese rebellion against Chinese rule in 1947)」。
中國佔領當局，在日本台灣佔領地得以屠殺台灣人之法理依據是戰爭法：
Those who rebel against their authority are regarded as deserving severest punishment. 那些不順從佔領當局的人是該受到最嚴厲之懲罰。
I.英國劍橋大學發行部(Cambridge University Press)於1910年所出版之
"The Cambridge Modern History(劍橋現代史)"述及「日本人的台灣佔領(Japanese occupation of Formosa)」：
Under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1895, which terminated the War, the island of Formosa, together with the outlying group of islands known as the Pescadores, were permanently ceded to Japan. Some sentiment influenced the demand for its cession, made by the victorious Japanese, as it was claimed that Formosa was occupied by their ancestors in the thirteenth century and that geologically it formed a link in the continuous chain of islands that constitutes the empire. .................. Little had been done by the Chinese during their long occupation to develop the resources of the island.
II.REPORTS ON THE SITUATION IN FORMOSA (TAIWAN), PARTICULARLY RESPECTING FORMOSAN DISSATISFATION WITH ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
The Consul at Taipei (Blake) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)
Taipei, January 10, 1947
The current susceptibility to rumors and fears of a return of Japanese in force may spring from the widely circulated story that certain formerly prominent but unidentified Japanese, upon leaving Keelung for repatriation, boasted that in as much as Japan was not defeated by China but by America, the Japanese would be back in Formosa within twenty years. This gives local emphasis to the belief that America, disappointed in China's failure to achieve unity and economic recovery, is now prepared to support Japan's recovery as fully as possible.
III.蔣介石於1949年5月25日，自澎湖馬公飛抵台灣高雄，隨後於6月24日抵達台北，定居陽明山第一賓館，於12月10日起，正式運作佔領兼流亡之中國殖民政權。美國和英國在1949年5月至8月間，所持之觀點（美政府機密檔案），值得參考，整理如下：
1. Telegram from the Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State
A. May 6
a. ................., although recognizing interim de facto Chinese administration Taiwan, US and other governments have responsibilities Taipei welfare and cannot disregard recent tendency Chinese to treat Taipei in unilateral manner endangering peace, welfare, natives not yet legally Chinese. Taipei must not be dragged into Chinese civil conflict.
b. Troops and official refugees continue pour in.
B. May 17
a. Captain of Keelung Harbor Police told me about 1,000 of 3,000 passengers on last week's ship from Shanghai were admitted without permits. At dinner Governor Chen confirmed this, ......
b. Mayor of Taipei, same dinner, expressed personal concern over law and order problems here result of "uncontrolled" influx.
C. May 17
I have the honor to enclose the text of a memorandum left at the Consulate General entitled "Appealing for a Prompt Action" and signed by a Chen Fong-Chu who lists himself as President of the Formosan Democratic Independent Party.
The memorandum, after reviewing Taiwan's troubles, claims that "the duty and responsibility of protection of Formosa must fall upon USA to drive out the unwanted KMT elements from our island once the term of trusteeship is impractical to them."
2. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) Washington, May 18, 1949
In accordance with the Department's instructions, Mr. Merchant has informally and orally indicated to a high ranking Government official on Formosa that a further influx of refugees from the mainland would prove detrimental to the political health of and an economic liability to Formosa.
3. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark), at Canton Washington, May 18, 1949
a. Dept's position re status Taiwan made clear in statement by Dept spokesman that final determination must await conclusion peace settlement for Japan.Comment drawn in Chi press and statement presenting contrary view by Wang Shih-Chieh indicate Chi well aware US position this matter.
b. In any event, implementation of Chi decision re governorship Taiwan does not fall within US competence and you shld so inform Li or his representative.
4. Telegram from the Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary Taipei, May 19, 1949
Provincial government and Taiwan garrison today
jointly proclaimed martial law here effective May 20. All ports closed except Keelung, Kaohsiung and Makung. Execution for usual offenses.
5. Memorandum by Mr. Livingston T. Merchant to the Director of the office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Washington, May 24, 1949
a. United States Government policy with respect to Formosa was established in NSC 37/2, 60 approved by the President on February 3, 1949, and in NSC 37/5, 61 approved by the President on March 3, 1949. In essence, this policy was designed to secure the denial of Formosa to any Communist or Communist-dominated government on the Mainland. The means available to secure this objective were stipulated to be diplomatic and economic support of the governing group on the island.
b. In November 1948 and in successive waves thereafter, rich refugees and units of the armed forces streamed into Formosa from the mainland. The total of such immigrants is variously estimated to run between five hundred thousand and a million. The present troop strength on the Island is now estimated to exceed two hundred thousand. The economic impact of this migration has been tremendous.
c. An immediate military assault on the Island by the Communists seems improbable (i.e., within the next six months). The preparation of the necessary military expedition would seem to require at least that length of time and there is no evidence yet at hand that the Communists are directing their primary attention to Formosa.
d. The Formosan population is restless and deeply resentful of their Chinese rulers.
e. In the past six months the economy of Formosa has deteriorated seriously and rapidly primarily because the population has suddenly been increased by between ten and twenty percent and the new arrivals have been economically non-productive.
f. To summarize and over simplify, we find ourselves faced on Formosa with a situation very similar to that which confronted us on the Mainland a year ago.The Government in power is corrupt and incompetent.
6. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, May 25, 1949
a. Tie stated that should a refugee Chinese government or a Chinese government in exile be set up in Taiwan, which is not yet legally Chinese territory, it is probable that the British Government would simply appoint a British Consulate in Tamsui as an office of the British Embassy in China. His own opinions were that any Chinese government established in Taiwan would be in a very ambiguous position and would present difficult problems to the governments of the world and especially to the United Nations.
b. Dening said, one thing is certain, the Communist must not be allowed by the Western nations to take Taiwan.
c. During the debate on China in the House of Commons on May 5, Mr. Walter Fletcher (Conservative) wished to discuss the problem of Taiwan. He was ruled out of order by the Deputy Chairman (Mr. Bowles) (labor), who made the following surprising statement:
"Formosa, I realize, is the seat of the present Nationalist Government of China. But it is not China. I think it was part of Japan. My geography may be weak, but surely Hong Kong, although ruled by the Colonial office here, is really geographically part of China. Formosa is a part of Japan, and is not really China, though the Chinese Government may be there."( 未完待續 )
台灣民政府 秘書長 林 志昇
2015/04/25
Taiwan in Truth
【台灣實相內容由美國國家機密檔案室提供。】
( 接續 )
d. The Economist, on May 21, published a short note regarding the "Ownerless Isle", that is Taiwan.
e. If the American Government still wishes to save anything from the wreck of its China policy, the unsettled status of Formosa in international law would afford a ground for treating the island as a separate entity, even if recognition were given to a Communist regime as the Government of China.
7. Telegram from the Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State
Taipei, June 8, 1949
K.C. Wu again looking well called on me on return from tour of Formosa. Highly encouraged by findings, believes Formosa can hold out with minimum troops since coastline is so easily defended. His impressions are that Formosans are loyal Chinese although anti-Nationalist Government, that they fear undisciplined soldiers and are uncertain of holding their jobs.
8.Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
(Butterworth) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)
Washington, June 9, 1949
a. At a meeting yesterday afternoon attended by Mr. Sandifer and Mr. Gerig, it was tentatively agreed that the most promising United Nations action which could be taken to deal with the urgent problem of Formosa was to request a special meeting of the General Assembly early this summer. The request would be accompanied by a full statement of the United States position, including an explanation of the basis for revoking, in part at least, the Cairo Declaration, and making plain that the United Nations' action envisioned was to call for and supervise an election on the Island in which the people of Formosa could vote on a return to the Mainland or some alternative trusteeship arrangement pending their qualification for independence.
b. An alternative and more appealing procedure would be to have the United States, preferably in company with several other friendly and interested powers, request a special session of the General Assembly to consider the problem of Forsoma, with the recommendation that a plebiscite be held on Formosa under the supervision of the United Nations in order to enable the people of Formosa to express their wished as to their future status.
c. This request to the United Nations would explain in some detail the responsibility which the United States feels toward the people of Formosa. It should also forthrightly point out that the post-war conditions in so far as Formosa is concerned, as envisaged at the time of the Declaration of Cairo, have not in fact materialized and that the record of misrule by the Chinese authorities on the Island requires that the people themselves should have the opportunity to decide their own destiny.
d. As a party to the Cairo Declaration, the British Government should be immediately informed of the direction of our thinking with a view to securing parallel action and the concurrent issuance by it of a similar statement.
e. There are disadvantages to this course. The Formosans might vote to return to China. While improbable, the risk has to be recognized.
f. The moral position of the United States would seem to be unassailable.
Subannex-Tab "A"
PROPOSED STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT TIME UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REQUESTS SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(This statement would be accompanied by a White Paper on the subject of Formosa)
The United States Government with the support of the Governments of the United Kingdom has requested the immediate calling for a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to consider the problem of Formosa toward the people of which Island, the United States feels an especial responsibility by reason of the part it played in the liberation of the Island.
At the special session of the General Assembly, the United States Government will propose that a free and secret plebiscite be held on the Island under the supervision of a United Nations Commission, in order to enable the people of Formosa to express their wishes with respect to a return to China or some alternative under which they would assume independence either immediately or after some preparatory period of United Nations trusteeship.
Under the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, to which both the United States and the United Kingdom were parties, the intention was expressed to restore to the Republic of China the territories, such as Manchuria and Formosa, which had earlier been lost to Japan.
The Cairo Declaration, however, further declared that the determination of the final status of Formosa must await the conclusion of a peace settlement for Japan. Having watched with mounting concern the misrule of Formosa by the Chinese governing authorities since VJ Day, the United States has reached the conclusion that the Chinese Government has forfeited the right to a perfunctory confirmation of sovereignty at the time of concluding a peace settlement with Japan, and that the people of Formosa are entitled to express freely and by secret ballot, their desires with respect to their own destiny.
The United States Government has no designs on Formosa. It does not seek military bases or special privileges of any character whatsoever on the Island. The United States Government, however, is rightfully concerned for the peace, prosperity and future of those whose home is on Formosa, and in conformity with its traditional espousal of the principle of self-determination, is laying before the United Nations the proposal described above.
9. Telegram from the Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
Nanking, June 10, 1949
Fugh drew inference from Huang's subsequent remarks that latter hoped that I could be persuaded to recommend to Department that public statement be made about legal aspects of island and thus discourage Generalissimo from establishing base there.
10. Telegram from the Consul General at Tientsin (Smyth) to the Secretary of State
Tientsin, June 21, 1949
Growing discussion among Chinese here re Formosa indicates misunderstanding its status. Many believe it virtually US territory, administered indirectly by MacArthur. Though many better educated disagree, average Chinese believes US considers Formosa of prime importance to Pacific defense line and that its "loss" would be serious blow. Result is widespread feeling US will not "let Formosa go" at any cost.
11. A POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO FORMOSA AND THE PESCADORES
Washington, June 23, 1949
Preliminary Comment
A. Any plan for the removal of the present authorities on Formosa and the Pescadores immediately encounters two serious obstacles:
a. There are now approximately 300,000 Chinese troops on the islands, who might resist such action and
b. this Government is more or less committed to Chinese sovereignty over the islands. 這個政府(美國政府)多少想要讓中國主權及於該島.
B. ......our hands are more or less tied by the commitments we made at Cairo and our actions in facilitating Chinese assumption of control over the islands. ......
...... the Philippines recollect that it was only recently invaded and ravaged from those islands; ...... they therefore propose that the powers which are still legally at war with Japan should immediately concern themselves with the threatened turmoil in this part of the Japanese Empire which is still awaiting final disposition at a peace settlement; under Article 107 of the United Nations Charter, this question is reserved for action by the powers which are at war with Japan.
......., the proposal should be made that, in view of the independent early history of Formosa and the Pescadores, of the shocking record of misrule during the past four years by the Chinese and of the many pleas from representative Formosans for autonomy, the powers which defeated Japan should promptly request the U.N. to conduct within one year a plebiscite regarding the ultimate disposition of the islands in accordance with the principles of self-determination.
C. ..............., this Government should announce publicly our reaction to the notification:
(1) The final disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, parts of the former Japanese Empire, awaits a decision at a peace settlement with Japan;
(2) Formosa and the Pescadores are at present under Chinese military administration because the United States Government enabled, the Chinese authorities at the time of the Japanese surrender to assume control over the islands, the decision to do this having flowed from the attitude expressed by the President in the Cairo Declaration;
(3) It was certainly not the intention of the American people, whose forces liberated Formosa and the Pescadores at so great a cost in blood and treasure, that the Cairo Declaration and this Government's action in facilitating Chinese control of the islands should have resulted in the creation of a menace to the stability and security of Southeast Asia and in the suffering which has been endured by the people of Formosa during the past four years;
(4) Hoping that the Chinese administration on the islands might turn to more responsible and constructive policies, this Government has during the past four years scrupulously refrained from giving publicity to conditions on the islands and to the appeals for liberation made by representative Formosans to this Government;
(5) In view of all the foregoing, this Government declares its willingness to associate itself with the decision of the majority of the concerned powers regarding
(a) the occupation and administration of the islands pending their disposition at a Japanese peace settlement and
(b) the future political status of the islands based upon the results of the proposed plebiscite.
D. We should attempt to obtain an agreed position with all of them excepting the Russians and Chinese regarding the change in the occupation and administration of the islands, acquainting our friends of our willingness to carry the main weight of the military phase of the operation. To minimize the unilateral appearance of this operation, we should urge the Filipinos, Australians, Indians, Pakistanis, Canadians and New Zealanders to make at least token forces available for the military operation.
E. At the same time, we should seek the collaboration of the Filipinos in providing all possible facilities for Formosan autonomy groups to make their case known both on the islands and elsewhere through broadcasts, publications, and other channels.
F. The Generalissimo should be informed that if he wishes to remain on the island, he will be accorded the status of a political refugee.
G. During the take-over and the subsequent administration of the island, we should avoid so far as possible a conspicuous role. We should always remember thatour aim is more to deny the islands to the Communists than to acquire responsibility for them and that our influence can be far more effectively exerted through indirect and discreet means rather than through unilateral heavy-handed measures.( 未完待續 )
台灣民政府 秘書長 林 志昇
2015/04/26
Taiwan in Truth
【台灣實相內容由美國國家機密檔案室提供。】
( 接續 )
12. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Consul at Taipei (Edgar)
Washington, June 30, 1949
Dept fully aware liability excess troops constitute on Taiwan but unwilling intervene formally with Governor on military matter, responsibility for which is Chinese.
13. Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
Washington, July 6, 1949
This memorandum, according to an attached chit, was canceled on July 6, 1949; a note stated that the views of the policy Planning Staff would be submitted by Mr. Kennan in a personal memorandum; latter not found in Department of State files.
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA AND THE PESCADORES
A. It would now seem clear that the only reasonably sure chance of denying Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists and insulating the islands from mainland authority would lie in the removal of the present Nationalist administration from the islands and in the establishment of a provisional international or U.S. regime which would invoke the principle of self-determination for the islanders and would eventually, prior to a Japanese peace settlement, conduct a plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Formosan separatism is the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism.
B. There are two ways in which this change in regime could conceivably be brought about.
a. One would be to induce other Far Eastern powers to take the lead in initiating international action to achieve the above purpose.
b. The other would be to announce a temporary unilateral reassertion of authority over the islands on the grounds that subsequent events had invalidated all the assumptions underlying the Cairo Declaration and that U.S. intervention was required by the interests of stability in the Pacific area as well as by the interests of the inhabitants of the islands.
Either would confront us with the eventual probable responsibility for removing the Chinese forces and many of the Chinese refugees by force to the mainland. This would involve a considerable amount of pushing people around, which would be unpleasant and might lead to serious moral conflicts within our own people and government.
The second alternative would offend the sensibilities of many people in the Department on legal and procedural grounds, and we would probably have to cut some legal corners to justify it.
C. All the advice I can get in the Department tells me that both of these possible courses should be rejected and that we should reconcile ourselves to the prospect of Formosa's falling into the hands of the Chinese Communists. I personally feel that if the second course were to be adopted and to be carried through with sufficient resolution, speed, ruthlessness and self-assurance, the way Theodore Roosevelt might have done it, it would be not only successful but would have an electrifying effect in this country and throughout the Far East. I have nothing to support this view but my own instinct.
D. My feeling is, therefore, that at this stage you should discuss this with the President and your colleagues in the National Security Council, and should make plain to them that the courses outlined above seem to be the only alternative to eventual Chinese Communist rule on the islands.
14. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) Washington, July 27, 1949
In response to a suggestion recently made to the American Consul at Taipei by one of the Governor's close advisors, I desire to present to you certain considerations which have been of concern to the Government of the United States of America with respect to the administration of the Island of Taiwan. It is unnecessary. I am sure, to remind your excellency of the special interest of this Government in that Island arising from the part which American armed forces played in its liberation, as well as from the fact that the final determination of the Island's status necessarily awaits a peace settlement with Japan.
Unhappily, the history of Chinese administration since VJ Day in Taiwan has fallen far short of the hopes of its people and of the expection of the United States at the time that administrative responsibility was turned over to the Republic of China.
In a spirit of friendly advice, there are listed below certain measures of self-help which the United States believes are necessary of achievement for the tranquility of Taiwan.
Firstly, and foremost, it would seem that the numbers of civilian emigres and mainland troops which have come to the Island in recent months should be reduced to the maximum extent possible .......
Secondly, it would seem that a concerted effort is necessary to stabilize the value of the Island's currency and thereby halt the inflation which by all reports has so drastically disrupted the economy of the Island in recent months. Such measures should include the increased taxes and improved tax collections methodto the end that all governmental expenditures, including those on behalf of the National Government, would be covered by revenue; ..........
Fourthly, the land reform measures already instituted should be pushed forward vigrously and expanded to the end that tenancy is reduced and the net return of the individual producer increased.
Finally, if the natives of Taiwan are to enjoy in fact the progressive achievement of their understandable and legitimate aspiration for an enlarging measures of self-government, then they must be increasingly and promptly brought into the political life of the Island and into position of responsibility in its administration.
15. Memorandum by the Department of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) Washington, August 4, 1949
Subject: Current Position of the U.S. With Respect to Formosa
A. Developments in Formosa since our present policy was determined upon make it desirable now to reexamine our situation.
B. To attain our main objective with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores-the denial of the islands to Communist control-current policy directives, as set forth in NSC 37/2, 94 and NSC 37/5, 95 call for
(1) developing and supporting a local non-Communist Chinese regime which will provide at least a modicum of decent government for the islands,
(2) discouraging the further influx of mainland Chinese, and
(3) maintaining discreet contact with potential native Formosan leaders in the event that some future use of a Formosan autonomous movement should be in the United States national interest.
C. The Governor of Formosa was informed of the serious view the United States took of the continued influx of refugee civilians and demoralized troops.
D. We face on Formosa today a situation analogous to that which confronted us on the mainland of China a year ago. The government in power is corrupt and incompetent. It lacks the will to take the necessary political and economic steps to modify the deep and growing resentment of the Formosans.
Moreover, economic aid from outside cannot in the absence of a basic change in the government alter or cure this situation, and so long as it endures, the ultimate passage of Formosa under Communist control, by external or internal action, appears probable.
IV. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles A. Fraleigh of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Washington, December 28, 1951
The representatives of Defense indicated that the phrase "Japan area" in the JCS draft was intended to be vague, and to permit the United States to argue that hostilities affecting Formosa, Sakhalin or Korea would be hostilities affecting "the Japan area".
於1951年9月8日簽署，1952年4月28日生效，於1960年6月23日因美日間之「安保條約(Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security)」生效，而失效之「美日共同安全條約(U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty)」，其Article 4之條文所提及之「日本區域(the Japan area)」其實是有包括台灣。
結論：
1. 日本人在13世紀時已開始在福爾摩沙島活動，直至德川幕府於1633年實施鎖國政策，禁止日本人赴海外發展。荷蘭人是獲日本幕府許可，得以在1624年8月間，自澎湖轉進至福爾摩沙島佔領，直至1662年被鄭成功政權取代。台灣自古屬日本而非中國，中國官方及至1683年才開始經營福爾摩沙島，然成效有限。
因此，福爾摩沙島之政權輪替軌跡，可說是日本於1624年讓與荷蘭，荷蘭是於1662年讓與鄭成功，鄭氏王朝是於1683年讓與大清帝國，大清帝國是於1895年讓與日本，這其中之「讓與」，其實是戰爭法中所謂的「征服與割讓」之意思，日本則於1945年4月1日依照國際法實施憲法，將台灣正式編入為日本國土之一部份。然自1945年10月25日起，因敗戰而被中國人佔領至今。日本是最早經營福爾摩沙島，也是唯一建構完整福爾摩沙島主權的國家。基於「萬國公法」完全適用於日本國土一部份之福爾摩沙島，其並非如英國「Economist雜誌」於1949年5月21日，所定位之「無主島(Ownerless Isle)」，錯誤認知台灣和日本間之法理關係，致使台灣地位成為真實版「羅生門」之主要原因。
2. 美國對於中國在台灣「完成整合及復甦經濟」失敗，感到失望，從而並不排除將台灣歸還日本之可能性。
3. 日本投降後，台灣是由中國佔領當局執行盟軍分配佔領，行政長官人選之決定並不在美國權限內。在天津的中國人之間，對台灣是議論紛紛，許多人認為台灣地位實際上是麥克阿瑟將軍間接治理下之美國領土，然，為錯誤認知。
4. 陳誠是在台灣佔領，並無遭受共產黨立即威脅之情勢下，頒布台灣戒嚴令。目的應是讓已下野之蔣中正先生，不是以「蔣總裁流亡」而是以「蔣元帥佔領」之名義，堂堂正正轉進日本台灣佔領。
5. 日本台灣並無依開羅公報歸還中國，在共產中國強力介入韓戰後，中國已經失去不侵略鄰國承諾，以致讓開羅宣言失其效力。台灣最終地位必須等待簽署對日和約才能決定，而美國是無可爭論，對所解放之台灣有特殊責任。
6. 中國人是在美國之默許下「流亡而非移民」至台灣。因此，在台海兩岸之中國人完成和解後（簽署ECFA），美國有責任設法處理已無流亡正當性之中國難民。
7. 美國在對日和約簽署前，曾計劃訴諸武力，移除中國對日本台灣之佔領。美國原有計劃慫恿菲律賓、澳洲、印度、巴基斯坦、加拿大及紐西蘭，至少象徵性出兵，以配合美國移除中國佔領政權之軍事行動。事實上，美國可以親自執行台灣佔領，讓台灣得以免於淪為中國統治之最佳保證。
8. 美國政府基於「開羅宣言」之承諾，多少想要讓中國主權及於台灣。一方面，曾考慮讓台灣由聯合國託管後，依公投以自決獨立或和中國合併，另一方面，卻擔憂台灣人會支持回歸中國，儘管是不可能，然而必須承認有此風險。
9. 所有美國對台灣之構想，均因韓戰爆發而破滅。韓戰一方面是救了蔣介石，另一方面卻是誤了台灣地位正常化。
10. 美國遠東事務辦公室主任Butterworth，明知中華民國並不擁有台灣主權，卻支持本質為「中國民政府」之台灣省政府，逾越戰爭法權限，向佔領地人民徵稅，自1949年4月14日起，在日本台灣佔領地實施「台灣省私有耕地租用辦法」，亦即所謂「三七五減租」土地改革政策。依戰爭慣例，佔領國「軍或民」政府是只能在「個別關稅領土(Separate Customs Territory)」架構內，設立「海關(customhouse)」，對進出口貨品「課以關稅(tariff)」，不能逕行向佔領地人民徵稅，移轉國民公法之國民納稅義務，也不能施行土地改革政策，移轉佔領地人民原本之財產所有權。
11. 早在1949年6月間，美國有鑑於中國佔領當局自日本投降日以來，在台灣不當治理，美國已決定中國政府已喪失在與日本簽訂和平條約時，循例確認台灣主權之權利。
12. 美國方面雖明知台灣人憎惡「腐敗且無能」之中國佔領當局，然基於反共，無選擇餘地，必須在外交及經濟上予以支持，確保台灣不致淪為共產黨統治。
在美國的認知中，台灣讓中國國民黨統治至少比讓中國共產黨統治好些。
13. 美國政府對台灣並無企圖、但有原則，就是「不能落入共產黨控制」，以致一方面接受雖然是「腐敗且無能」，然而是「反共且親美」之中國佔領當局，並期待其能推行更負責任及建設性之政策。而另一方面，則是在過去四年中謹慎地避免公開島內情形，及台灣人代表向美國政府之訴請解放。
14. 如果未來本土台灣人讓台灣國際地位正常化運動行使，將會是美國國家利益，美國方面需要和有潛力之本土台灣人領袖保持謹慎的接觸。
15. 美國方面認為本土台灣人如想實質享有充分之自治，就應加強、且儘速參與島內政治，承擔治理責任。
台灣民政府 秘書長 林 志昇
2015/04/27
