林志昇控美案的重要辯論文,以下的這段辯論文有請秘書長指導,提供中文翻譯,因為真的看不懂

[楊朝程]

 

THE COURT: If the United States is the de jure sovereign over Taiwan, would they be nationals?   MS. PATTERSON: Not necessarily, Your Honor.   THE COURT: Okay, so it’s possible that those questions are actually separate.  

MS. PATTERSON: Yes, Your Honor. And as we -   THE COURT: Why is that? I don’t -   MS. PATTERSON: Because national is a statutory term defined in Immigration Nationality Act.   THE COURT: America, Samoa and Swain Islands -   MS. PATTERSON: Exactly, Your Honor. And I suppose that plaintiffs are alleging that there is some non-statutory route to national status and I think that there’s a pretty solid wall of precedent all eight circuit courts to have examined whether or not you can become a national within the meaning of the Immigration Act by any non-statutory routes. They clearly said you cannot.   THE COURT: But what right -   THE COURT: Was that still true after Boumediene?   MS. PATTERSON: I -   THE COURT: I mean I think what Mr. Camp is arguing is that if de facto sovereignty is enough, then if they have a claim of de jure sovereignty, they’re actually in a stronger position.   MS. PATTERSON: I think that’s simply not true, Your Honor. All of the cases, Boumediene and the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court made it clear that what they were examining there was the United States objected to degree of controller perhaps de facto sovereignty. And the Boumediene decision explicitly noted the same language that the District Court here noted from Vamiliar Brown (phonetic sp.) they declined to question the Government’s assertion that the United States was not the de jure sovereign over Guantanamo Bay, just as this Court should decline to question the Executive’s assertion that United States is not the de jure sovereign over Taiwan. So in all of the plaintiffs’ claims here rest on an assertion of de jure sovereignty. They are not asserting nor could they assert that the United States exercises any actual control over Taiwan.   THE COURT: But doesn’t that lead us to a sort of odd result that de facto sovereignty is more powerful than de jure sovereignty if that’s what exists here?   MS. PATTERSON: That may be odd, but that’s what the Supreme Court said and actually I think there’s a good reason for that, Your Honor. In the Insular Cases, or at least in the Boumediene decision discussing the Insular Cases, the court said the issue there wasn’t necessarily about the you know, de jure reach of the Constitution over a particular territory. It was what limitations in here and the United States’ actual exercise of power over people so that the constitutional limitations follow an actual exercise of power as opposed to a paper trail.   THE COURT: What rights would come to someone who couldn’t meet the statutory requirement for being a national but lived in a territory over which the United States exercises de jure sovereignty?   MS. PATTERSON: I don’t know that that question’s ever been presented because I don’t think it’s ever been explored if the United States holds simply de jure sovereignty but doesn’t exercise any actual control. I don’t know what rights we have there.       THE COURT: --but what about in de facto sovereignty, I’m just wondering other than the statutory right regarding national which you say precludes, are there any other rights that someone would have?   MS. PATTERSON: If the United States were exercising, I think your question is de facto?   THE COURT: Yes.   MS. PATTERSON: Yes, I think the Insular Cases did discuss what various rights would attend the United States exercise of actual power of their objective degree or control. And the court noted that it’s a highly case specific type of analysis that depends on the United States’ particular relationship. And I think in some of those Insular Cases, the court indicated that the stronger the ties, the more the control the United States had over the area. That could change the shape of the constitutional limitations that went with the exercise of that power. So I can’t offer you up a general laundry list of rights that might go along with an exercise of de facto power.  

THE COURT: So they don’t include the right to a passport.   MS. PATTERSON: I don’t think they would include the right to the passport, certainly, Your Honor. If there are no further questions from the Court, the Government will rest.   THE COURT: Actually I do have a question.   MS. PATTERSON: Yes.   THE COURT: It’s a minor point. In your red brief at 18, you quote our decision in Boumediene that quote, “The determination of sovereignty over an area is for the legislative and Executive requirements.” Do you agree with that, is that a legislative function, determination of sovereignty over an area? I would have thought that the Government’s position would be that that’s exclusively for the Executive. And the Constitution gives to the Executive the right to recognize ambassadors (indiscernible).   MS. PATTERSON: Well certainly, Article 2 is rich with delegations to the Executive Branch. To the extent that the legislative powers hold a role here, I think that they’ve clearly spoken in this case. I don’t know if every case would involve a legislative weighing in on the particular sovereignty.       這是原文，不容任何人斷章取義，我們會注意中統派言論。       作者：林 志 昇（武林 志昇˙林 峯弘）   「福爾摩沙法理建國會」執行長   2009/10/15

標籤：控美案, 林志昇

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『溫故知新』於林志昇等控美案高等法院的言詞辯論，你將能更進一步『解行相應』、『理事俱足』於台灣民政府(Taiwan Civil Government)的所為何事：

1.林志昇等控美案的上訴高等法院之言詞辯論 (法庭現場英文原音及英漢字幕)；

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